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Abstract
Wireless networking has become very popular in recent years due to the increase in adoption of mobile
devices. As more and more employees demand for Wi-Fi access for their devices, more companies have been
jumping onto the "Bring Your Own Device" (BYOD) bandwagon[1] to appease their employees. One
such example of an enterprise wireless infrastructure is the George Washington University’s GWireless.
For this project, I will attempt to capture hashes of authentication credentials from users who are
connecting to the GWireless network using what is commonly known as the "evil twin" attack. I will
document the hardware, software used and steps taken to configure the devices. I will then evaluate the
feasibility of such an attack, explore variations of the attack and document measures that can be taken to
prevent such an attack.
I. Introduction
Many organizations worldwide turn toWPA-Enterprise (802.1x) standard when
implementing a secure wireless network. Some
of the merits of 802.1x include
• Auditability - Each user logs on using
his own credentials instead of a common
password when using WPA-PSK mode.
• Interoperability - All major operating sys-
tems support 802.1x without the need for
additional software.
• Authentication - All variants of 802.1x
include Extensible Authentication Proto-
col (EAP). As part of the EAP handshake
process, the client would verify the cer-
tificate sent by the server, hence ensuring
its identity.
GWireless uses 802.1x standard as well.
However, as far as I know, GWU does not re-
lease the server certificates. As shown in the
screenshot below, the instructions for connect-
ing to GWireless also do not mention the need
to configure certificates of any type. Therefore,
there is no way for client devices to verify the
authenticity of an access point.
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II. Background
The 802.1x standard has support for many
combinations of EAP configurations. Some
of the more common configurations are Exten-
sible Authentication Protocol - Transport Layer
Security (EAP-TLS) and Protected Extensible
Authentication Protocol - Microsoft Challenge
Handshake Authentication Protocol v2 (PEAP-
MS-CHAPv2). EAP-TLS is widely recognised
to be the more secure among the two[2]. It
supports mutual authentication in which both
client and server are issued a cert and both par-
ties verify the identity of the other party before
performing further authentication. However, it
is more rarely seen as compared to PEAP-MS-
CHAPv2 which is a password based system.
For PEAP-MS-CHAPv2, the client verifies the
identity of the server by ensuring that the the
certificate chain leads to a root CA which is
trusted by the machine. The server authenti-
cates the client through the use of a challenge
response mechanism to prove that the client
knows the username/password combination.
However, specifying server certificate is op-
tional, if not configured on a client, the client
will trust any access point (AP) that broadcasts
the same service set identifier (SSID) and uses
the same configuration.
GWireless uses the PEAP-MS-CHAPv2 con-
figuration and does not provide the server cer-
tificate for download[3]. Thus clients connect-
ing to GWireless will have no way to verify the
identity of an access point.
III. Method
To perform this attack, I have relied on off-
the-shelf consumer equipment that is readily
accessible. The equipment consists of a sin-
gle laptop running Ubuntu 14.04 as well as
an Asus RT-N15U router, an entry grade wire-
less router. As pictured below, the case was
stripped out for a previous project, but no hard-
ware or software modification was done to the
router.
For the RADIUS server, I have used a
modified version of FreeRadius[4] that has
been patched to log down challenge and re-
sponse pairs from client authentication at-
tempts. FreeRadius is run as a daemon on
the laptop and listens to a specified port. The
laptop was configured to use a static IP ad-
dress.
The router is connected to the laptop us-
ing an ethernet cable. The router’s default
firmware supports RADIUS authentication. It
was set to AP mode and the radius server’s
IP was set to the laptop’s IP. The shared secret
was set to the same value as the config file on
the laptop. The SSID was changed to "GWire-
less" and the security mechanism was set to
PEAP/MS-CHAPv2.
Once the setup was done, any wireless de-
vice in the vicinity that has previously been
associated with "GWireless" will try to connect
to the rogue AP if the signal from the rogue
AP is stronger than the real AP. This was one
of the reasons why I chose to use an actual
router instead of a soft AP like hostapd. The
wireless signal emitted from a soft AP would
likely be too weak for the attack to work. The
connection to the rogue AP will fail because
the radius server does not have the plaintext
password and thus cannot complete the chal-
lenge response. As a result, the client device
would then try to connect to another AP broad-
casting the same SSID. Thus, this attack will
likely remain undetected. The only possible
giveaway is that it takes a slightly longer time
to connect to the network.
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IV. Results
I set up the equipment as specified at the
ground floor of the Science and Engineering
Hall (SEH) and proceeded to successfully col-
lect 25 sets of credentials over a period of 90
minutes. Included in each set were the user-
name, MS-CHAPv2 hash and the challenge
response pair. The credentials can be found
together with this report.
V. Feasibility
Up until this point, obtaining the hash required
minimal amount of resources. An adversary
only requires a laptop and a router that sup-
ports 802.1x which can be purchased for un-
der $500. All software used is free and open
source. However, breaking the hash would
require slightly more resources as described
below.
I. Non-targeted attacks
An adversary can place the access point at
a well trafficked location to gather as many
hashes as possible and perform and offline
dictionary attack later. Cassola et al. [5], per-
formed a similar experiment on 17 CS graduate
students and managed to crack the first pass-
word after 30 seconds and the 2nd after 2 hours
using a 24 Xeon-CPU server. Considering the
ease of obtaining a much larger sample size as
well as the fact that the average user is likely
to have a less secure password than a CS grad-
uate student, it is highly likely that a desktop
machine would suffice to crack a single hash
in a reasonable amount of time (<24 hours).
II. Targeted attacks
The modus operandi for a targeted attack
would be slightly different. In this case, the
adversary would be interested in capturing the
hash of a user with elevated privileges, hence
he would try to get as close as possible to the
target while running the fake AP to get the
target’s devices to authenticate with it. Once
the target’s handshake has been captured, he
can proceed to perform an offline attack. Pico
Computing[6] built an FPGA box that is ca-
pable of breaking DES encryption within 24
hours. They have also offered a cloud service
to crack all MS-CHAPv2 handshakes with a
success rate of 100% for only $20. Hence such
an attack would be highly feasible as well.
In conclusion, both non-targeted and target
attacks are feasible and can be carried out by
an adversary on a low budget.
VI. Attack Impact
The GW NetID is being used for multiple pur-
poses ranging from authenticating to GWire-
less, accessing GW email accounts and the
Blackboard. An adversary who has obtained a
user’s credentials would be able to gain access
to all these services. If the user is a student, an
adversary will be able to view his assignment
grades and submit assignments on his behalf,
thus compromising his privacy. Obtaining the
credentials to a professor’s account could pos-
sibly allow a student to change his/her grade,
thus presenting a larger problem. If the cre-
dentials belong to a systems administrator, the
adversary would likely have even greater priv-
ileges.
An adversary would also be able to access
all emails in the account and impersonate the
user. He could also access or post illegal con-
tent on the internet which would implicate the
user when law enforcement investigates.
Apart from that, it is likely that the staff
members are able to access restricted file
servers and printers using their NetID creden-
tials and these resources would similarly fall
into the adversary’s hands.
VII. Variations of attack
I. Deauthentication attack
A deauthentication attack involves sending a
packet to dissociate clients from a particular
basic service set identifier (BSSID). The client
will then automatically try to reconnect to the
3
• Vulnerability Analysis of GWireless •
GWireless network. If the rogue AP’s signal
is the strongest, the client will then attempt
to connect to the rogue AP. A deauth attack
is especially useful if client device’s roaming
aggressiveness is low. Roaming aggressiveness
is a measure of how often a client device will
check and try to connect to an access point
with stronger signal.
Therefore, a deauth attack will allow an
adversary to capture more handshakes in a
shorter period of time. The deauth attack
should be executed while the rogue AP is run-
ning. For ease, the laptop running the radius
server can also be used to mount a deauth at-
tack. An adversary would have to install the
open source aircrack-ng[7] suite and use the
aireplay-ng command to launch a deauth at-
tack. However, a deauth attack is more likely
to be detected since the victim will experi-
ence multiple disconnection and connection
attempts.
The reason why this attack is possible is
because management frames are sent in the
clear. This is because these frames are used to
broadcast an SSID or to initiate a connection,
thus a prospective client will need to be able to
read these frames even before authentication
and key negotiation. Therefore, these frames
cannot be encrypted.
II. Captive portals
The captive portal attack exploits a vulnerabil-
ity on most iOS/OSX devices running a certain
version. While the challange response phase is
taking place, the radius server will send a TLV-
success packet. The client device is supposed
to restart the connection attempt since the chal-
lenge response was not completed. However,
a vulnerable device will respond with a TLV-
success packet as well. The client device will
then check for the existence of a captive portal
and load it in the browser. A victim who is
not technologically savvy or familiar with the
AP may then enter his username and password
which will be transmitted in the clear to the
server.
However, this attack is much more intrusive
and easily detectable since a user who is famil-
iar with the GWireless network will have never
seen the captive portal before and will find it
suspicious. That being said, this attack[8] was
carried out at DEFCON 21, a conference for
hackers and security professionals, managed
to trick a number of them into revealing their
credentials.
VIII. Ethical considerations
I did not obtain permission from any of the
victims to carry out this attack. In most cases,
I did not even know who the victim was, thus
it is difficult to obtain permission from any of
them. I limited myself to carrying out only the
credentials collection portion of the attack as
I did not want to possess the cleartext pass-
word for any other user. For the same reason,
I did not perform the captive portal attack as it
would reveal the cleartext password. I also de-
cided against performing the deauthentication
attack since it is will cause a loss in network
connectivity and disruption to all users in the
vicinity.
IX. Recommendations
To prevent an Evil Twin attack, GWU can up-
load the certificate used by their radius server
so that it can be downloaded and used by all
users who are concerned over their privacy. By
doing so, they will not inconvenience the gen-
eral public who can choose not to supply a
certificate but allow concerned users to do so.
Users who have configured the certificate will
not be vulnerable to the evil twin attack.
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As depicted in the screenshot above, I ob-
tained the certificate chain by doing a packet
capture while connecting to a real access point.
After configuring my devices with the certifi-
cates, I found that they were not longer trying
to authenticate with the rogue AP, thus prov-
ing that the recommendation would work. The
capture file and certificates will be made avail-
able together with this report.
Even though EAP-TLS would be ideal, I am
against recommending it. This is because a
user certificate would have to be generated for
every user and the less tech savvy would have
problems configuring their devices to connect
to GWireless using the certificates. As a result,
there would be a huge problem with certificate
management and technical support. EAP-TLS
would be better suited to a smaller organisation
which has a greater need for security.
In the long term, large organizations like
GWU would have to move away from MS-
CHAPv2 towards a protocol that is more resis-
tant against a brute force attack. MS-CHAPv2
uses DES to encrypt the challenges and MD4
to hash the passwords, both of which are algo-
rithms of yesterday. We would need a protocol
that incorporates more recent algorithms like
AES and SHA-2 to stay ahead of the game.
X. Conclusion
This report has shown that it is feasible to
stealthily recover user credentials from the
GWireless network using off-the-shelf equip-
ment. Although I did not demonstrate crack-
ing the hashes to retrieve plaintext credentials,
I have outlined the steps and provided data
from other research that shows its feasibility.
The report has also briefly touched on various
variations that are slightly more intrusive but
likely to give a better result. Lastly, I have also
proposed a recommendation that would op-
tionally improve security for privileged users
while still not inconveniencing the general pop-
ulace.
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